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THE COPYRIGHT LAW AND ITS RELEVANCE TO CATV:
CAN AN OLD DOG BE TAUGHT NEW TRICKS
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Copyright Protection
This nation has long recognized the necessity and importance of granting
special protection to the products of our artists and inventors. Such preferential
treatment is deemed essential as a means of insuring a continuing supply of
artistic and inventive contributions for the use and enjoyment of our citizenry.
The framers of our Constitution gave early recognition to this concept when
they empowered Congress
To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings.1
This section of the Constitution was the basis for a series of copyright legis-
lation, the most recent of which is the Copyright Act of 1909.2
The objective sought to be achieved by copyright legislation necessarily
involves the balancing of competing interests so as to assure that the public
is able to economically use and enjoy the products of artists and inventors
while at the same time assuring a degree of protection to the artists and in-
ventors that will encourage them to continue making their contributions.
In addition to the difficulty involved in balancing these interests, the 1909
legislation which seeks to achieve the balance is itself hampered by the fact
that it is being applied to situations not anticipated at the time of its enactment.
The development of commercial radio broadcasting presented the first real
test of the capacity of the 1909 Act to deal with later innovations. The alter-
natives open for resolving these new copyright problems rested either in judicial
interpretation of the existing Copyright Act or in congressional action to speci-
fically accommodate the new situations. The former alternative prevailed, with
the courts using the technique of "semantic extension"-3 to make the Copyright
Act prospective in nature, and thus capable of accommodating certain situations
not specifically anticipated when drafting the original statute itself.
A recent development in the communications industry, however, may finally
exhaust the willingness and ability of the court to effectively create copyright
law for new innovations. This development is CATV systems, or cable television.
1. U.S. COZNST. art. I, § 8. The sole interest of the United States, and the primary
object in conferring monopoly lies in the general benefit derived by the public from the labor
of authors. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932). Reward to copyright holders
is a secondary consideration. See United States v. Paramount, 334 U.S. 151 (1948).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964).
3. See Jerome H. Remick & Sons v. American Auto Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th
Cir. 1925). See also 2 SUaTaL1,ND, STATUTORY CoNsTaucToI § 5201 (3d ed. 1969 Cum.
Supp.).
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The increasing use of CATV systems has created new problems in the
field of public communications. Several underlying issues present themselves
in the context of recent copyright and Federal Communications Commission
litigation involving CATV systems. Basic inquiry is directed to: (1) whether
the Copyright Act is adequate to resolve contemporary problems of copyright
in the communications industry; (2) if it is, whether the radio cases inter-
pretation of its terms have relevance for the cable television cases; and (3) if
it is not, whether a revised Copyright Act is desirable, or, whether a third ave-
nue is to be applied, i.e., regulation by the Federal Communications Commission
(F.C.C.).
II. THE COPYRIGHT ACT AND THE RADIO CASES
A. The Copyright Act of 1909
In 1909, when the Copyright Act in substantially its present form was
enacted, commercial radio was embryonic and television was unheard of. At
that time, the primary method of presenting copyrighted material consisted of
live performances in theaters and arenas. These performances presumably
reached no further than the walls of the auditorium in which they were per-
formed, and lasted no longer than the time it took to perform them, for the
technology of amplification and reproduction as we know it, was then non-
existent. Therefore, there was no danger to the copyright holder of having a
performance which he authorized reach far and beyond the audience he antici-
pated. It was with this method of presenting copyrighted material in mind that
the drafters designed the Copyright Act of 1909. The Act protects the holders of
copyrighted materials by granting them the exclusive right to present their
works. Several protected methods of presenting these works are enumerated in
the statute: delivering, authorizing the delivery, reading, reproducing, and most
important for the purposes of this discussion, performing.4 An infringement of
any of these exclusive rights subjects the infringer to statutory damages as well
as any actual damages subsequently determined through civil suit2
The development of commercial radio broadcasting, however, drastically
upset the certainty that once accompanied a copyright agreement, for it pro-
vided a new manner of performing copyrighted materials. When radio was used
as the vehicle for performing copyrighted material, the extent of the audience,
and consequently the amount of royalties, could no longer be gauged by the
seating capacity of the theater in which it was performed.
In 1925, the courts began considering the problems of liability for infringe-
ment of copyrighted material through the use of radio broadcasts." In deciding
that an unlicensed broadcast on commercial radio of a copyrighted song con-
4. See 17 U.S.C. at § 1 (1964).
5. Id. at § 101(b).
6. Jerome H. Remick & Sons v. American Auto Accessories Co., S F.2d 411 (6th Cir.
1925).
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stituted statutory infringement, the court realized the problem of applying the
Copyright Act to an emerging technological innovation:
[T]he statute may be applied to new situations not antici-
pated by Congress, if, fairly construed, such situations come within
its intent and meaning . . . While statutes should not be stretched
to apply to new situations not fairly within their scope, they should
not be so narrowly construed as to permit their evasion because of
changing habits due to new inventions and discoveries.7
B. The Radio Cases
1. Multiple Performance
The first case to deal with "performance" as the basis for finding a person
other than the original broadcaster liable for copyright infringement was Buck
v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.8 LaSalle Hotel operated a master radio receiving
set from which wires were run to speakers in all public and private rooms in
the hotel, enabling guests to hear the programs received by the master set.
Copyrights to some of the songs thus transmitted-from unlicensed radio
broadcasts-belonged to Buck. Against Buck's charge that the defendant had
infringed its "performing" rights, the hotel argued that there could be only one
"performance" of the song per broadcast, and that under these facts, the radio
station had exhausted the performance right by its broadcast. In finding for
the copyright holder and rejecting the hotel's assertion that each rendition
of a protected work can give rise to only one performance, the Court formulated
the "multiple performance doctrine."
While this [multiple performance] may not have been possible
before the development of radio broadcasting, the novelty of the
means used does not lessen the duty of the courts to give full protec-
tion to the monopoly of public performance for profit which Congress
has secured to the composer.9
The Court concluded that there was very little difference between the situation
of a hotel engaging an orchestra to perform copyrighted songs without the
permission of the copyright holder, and that of its making available to its guests
the same song through the use of a master radio receiving set and a network
of loudspeakers and headphones.
2. Quantum of Rebroadcasters' Acts
In the Society of European State Authors and Composers, Inc. v. New York
Hotel Statler Co.,10 the district court was confronted with the question of a
hotel's liability for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act as a result
of making radio programing available to its guests. The facts in SESAC, how-
7. Id. at 411.
8. 283 U.S. 191 (1931) [hereinafter referred to as Buck].
9. Id. at 198.
10. 19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) [hereinafter referred to as SESAC].
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ever, differed from those in Buck. In Buck, the guests had no control over
the speaker system-they could neither turn it off, nor choose the station which
they wished to listen to. In SESAC, two different radio stations were received
at the defendant hotel and made available to its guests. The guests could thus
choose which of the stations they wished to listen to, as well as turn the
speakers off by activating an on-off switch. The hotel premised its defense
upon this distinction: the only performance that occurred took place at the
time the guest turned on the speaker in his room, and, therefore, the operation
of the hotel's receiving set and speaker systems in and of itself did not con-
stitute a "performance" within the meaning of the Copyright Act. The district
court found the hotel liable for copyright infringement, basing its decision on
the meaning of "performance" handed down in the Buck case. In its reasoning
the court concerned itself with the result of the hotel's actions-affording pre-
sentation of a copyrighted piece of music without the permission of the copy-
right holder. The court viewed as irrelevant the last physical act required to
convert the radio signal into an audible sound. The court said:
I do not agree to that principle [only the last step counts] as
here applied, for the reception of a broadcast program by one who
listens to it is not any part of the performance itself. Indeed, both
physically and mentally it is about as far removed from performance
as can well be imagined.'1
Therefore, SESAC looked at the defendant's contribution to the total process
and concluded, as did the court in Buck, that
... when the owner of a hotel does as much as is done in the Hotel
Pennsylvania to promote the reproduction and transmission within
its walls of a broadcast program received by it, it must be considered
as giving a performance thereof within the principle laid down by the
Supreme Court in [Buck].12
It thus appeared that hotels would be unable to successfully deny that
they had "performed." However, they hoped they would be able to avoid lia-
bility for their "performance" through the finding of an implied license grant-
ing them permission to "perform" the copyrighted material.
3. The Doctrine of Implied Licenses
A footnote in Buck raised an issue subsidiary but critical to the role of
copyright in the emerging radio industry-that of implied license. Under the
theory of implied license it is argued that once an authorized performance of
a copyrighted material is broadcast, it is available for the use of anyone who
can receive and rebroadcast the performance.'3 Thus, if under the doctrine of
multiple performance, a party is charged with "performance" on the grounds
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id.
13. 40 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cal. 1929) [hereinafter referred to as Debaum].
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that he rebroadcast an authorized performance of a copyrighted work without
the permission of the copyright holder, he could raise as a defense the proposi-
tion that he received permission from the copyright holder to rebroadcast by
virtue of a license implied from the original agreement between the copy-
right holder and the original broadcaster. The issue was first raised by way
of dictum in Buck v. Debaum.14 There the court held that there was no copy-
right infringement on the part of a restaurant owner who provided entertain-
ment for his customers through the operation of a regular radio receiving set.
The set in question had no extra amplifying devices nor any additional speakers
attached to it. The court was of the opinion that when the copyright holders
of the material in question licensed the broadcasting station to disseminate the
song, "they impliedly sanctioned and consented to any 'pick-up' out of the air
that was possible in radio reception." 15 This dicta is apparently what Justice
Brandeis was making reference to in his footnote in Buck where he stated:
If this copyrighted composition had been broadcast by [the radio
station] with plaintiff's consent, a license for its commercial reception
and distribution by the hotel company might possibly have been im-
plied. Compare with Buck v. Debaum.16
Thus, by thrust of dicta at least, the court in Buck envisioned the issue it
was to face, if not the answer it was to pose, in the later CATV system situation.
Mr. Justice Brandeis' footnote suggestion was later discussed in SESAC,
whose facts further differed from those in Buck in that the station that originally
broadcast the songs in question had obtained a license from the copyright
holder to broadcast these songs. The licensing agreement, however, was written
so that performance was authorized only for the radio station, and expressly
prohibited any sublicensing of the right to perform the material by the radio
station-licensee. In its discussion of the defense raised by the defendant re-
garding an implied license, the court examined the licensing agreement entered
into between the copyright holder and the radio broadcasting company, con-
cluding that by its very terms it was intended to authorize performance ex-
clusively by the radio station and by no other party. In the court's opinion,
the clause therein which expressly proscribed any type of sublicensing agree-
ments was superfluous; it was intended merely to reinforce the objective sought
to be achieved by both parties, i.e., the grant of a limited authorization to per-
form. The court dealt with Justice Brandeis' footnote by stating:
If I am wrong in this view of the limitations, and, in order to
protect the copyright owner, such limitation is necessary on such a
14. Id.
15. Id. at 735. It appears, however, that the rationale of the court in this case was
considerably weakened by the "multiple performance doctrine" later established in Buck.
In this case the court states: "The actions, play, and use of the Copyrighted composition
has been completed within the studio." (p. 735). This statement would be certainly ques-
tionable under the later "multiple performance doctrine."
16. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 at 199, n.5 (1931).
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license as I have before me, the limitation quoted above certainly
exorcises the possibility of any implied sub-license, glanced at by Mr.
Justice Brandeis in a footnote to his opinion in the LaSalle Hotel
case .... 17
The court's treatment in SESAC of Justice Brandeis' footnote brings into
sharp focus a dichotomy which exists within the theory of implied license:
licenses implied in fact as opposed to licenses implied in law. The former
would result from a finding, as a matter of fact, that the intent of the parties
to the original licensing agreement was to extend the right of performance to
parties outside the original agreement. Such a conclusion would have to rest
upon the agreement itself and would not be directly influenced by considerations
of public policy. Inasmuch as any finding of such a license is based upon the
intent of the bargaining parties, an express intention of the parties found in their
agreement prohibiting sublicensing, or unauthorized use of the performance
would seemingly be sufficient to defeat the possibility that an implied in fact
license exists.
The license implied in law is based not on the agreement and the intention
of the parties to it, rather, it is the result of a finding by the court, as a matter
of law, as to what result should obtain. It is, in effect, an opportunity for the
court to reach a conclusion in a given case which it feels is warranted by the
dictates of public policy. Thus, any finding based upon the existence of a
license implied in law is in reality nothing more than the statement of a legal
conclusion. It follows, therefore, that the inclusion of express prohibitions in a
licensing agreement which a court believes to be inimicable with public policy
will be rendered ineffective by means of the court declaring the existence of a
license implied in law, which would affect a result thought to be consonant
with the public policy.
The problem created by the Brandeis footnote in Buck is that it is not
clear which type of implied license was alluded to.'8 The court in SESAC
apparently assumed that Brandeis was referring to an implied in fact license
and accofdingly held that no such license could be implied from an agreement
that expressly proscribed sublicensing of the protected material by the licensee.
It would thus appear that SESAC had settled the effect that specific proscrip-
tions in a contract would have with respect to the existence of implied in fact
licenses. Its decision, however, still left open the possibility of raising the defense
of a license implied in law, or in more realistic terms, it left available a means
by which a court could implement what it considered to be in the best interests
of the public, regardless of the express intention of the contracting parties.
17. Society of European State Authors and Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler
Co., 19 F. Supp. 1 at 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
18. Id. at 6.
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III. FORTNIGHTLY AND THE RADIO CASES
On the basis of the Buck decision, copyright holders and radio broadcasters
established a framework for operations that has prevailed for the past forty
years. The initial development of the television industry posed no great challenge
to the existing copyright-broadcaster structure. There was very little significance
to be attached to the factual differences involved in a hotel providing television
receivers in its guest rooms as contrasted to radio receiving sets.
The introduction of CATV systems, however, does pose a serious question
as to the propriety of applying Buck to this new innovation, and, ultimately,
the adequacy of the statute upon which Buck was based, i.e., the Copyright
Act of 1909. The expanding operation of CATV systems involves policy con-
siderations and complex factual situations that were not present when Buck was
decided, let alone when the Copyright Act was adopted. Such can be seen
through an analysis of Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.'9
and the court's struggle therein with the precedent of the radio cases. A brief
discussion of the workings of a CATV system is necessary, however, to set the
context for the analysis as well as to emphasize the extent of the innovation
with which the courts were faced.
A. Technical Aspects of CA TV Systems
Basically, CATV systems receive and amplify "signals transmitting pro-
grams broadcast by one or more television stations and distribute such signals
by wire or cable to subscribing members of the public" 20 for a fee. Initially,
CATV systems were installed in areas where there was no local broadcasting
service, or in areas where reception was made difficult or impossible because of
mountainous or rugged terrain. Through the use of sophisticated, powerful
amplification equipment and the use of coaxial cables, which insulated the
system's output signals from atmospheric conditions as well as overcoming the
problem of physical interference from mountains and irregular terrain, CATV
systems were able to provide peak reception to areas theretofore unable to
receive any type of programing. As a result of a growing demand for more
variety in television programing, CATV systems were introduced for the purpose
of bringing broadcasts from distant cities into areas already being served
adequately by local broadcasters. In some instances these distant broadcasts
could have been picked up by the viewer with the aid of a roof-top antenna;
in other instances such reception would have been impossible. Revenue for
CATV systems is generated by, first, an initial charge to the subscriber for
installing a "drop-wire" from the main trunk of the system to the subscriber's
home, and, second, a fixed monthly charge thereafter.
19. 392 U.S. 390 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as Fortnightly].
20. See 47 C.F.R. § 74.1101(a) (1969).
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B. Fortnightly's Operations
The Fortnightly Corporation owned and operated CATV systems in the
towns of Clarksburg and Fairmont, West Virginia.21 These areas were served
by two local television stations, but because of the topography of the locale, most
residents were unable to receive signals from neighboring areas. Subscription to
Fortnightly's systems allowed area residents to receive broadcasts from five
additional stations: three from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, one from Steubenville,
Ohio, and one from Wheeling, West Virginia. Fortnightly's systems consisted of
large antennas located on hills above each city, with connecting coaxial cables
leading to a building which housed the "head equipment." This equipment
amplified and modulated the signals received and converted them to different
frequencies in order to transmit the signals effectively while maintaining and
improving their strength. These new signals were sent out from the "head
equipment" to individual sets by means of connecting coaxial cables. In the
course of its operations, Fortnightly neither originated its own programs nor
edited the programs it carried.2
United Artists Television, Inc. granted licenses to each of the five stations
mentioned above to broadcast certain motion pictures on which it held the copy-
rights. These licenses did not authorize carriage of the broadcasts by CATV
systems, and in several instances, expressly prohibited such carriage. Broadcasts
made under these licenses were carried as part of the normal service furnished
by Fortnightly to its subscribers. United Artists sued Fortnightly in Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York23 for infringement under
sections 1 (c) and (d) of the Federal Copyright Act.24 These subsections reserve
21. On December 31, 1963, Fortnightly had 9,571 and 7,047 subscribers at Clarksburg
and Fairmont respectively. The monthly rate charged ranged from $3.75 to $5.00 per in-
stallation, which was in addition to an installation fee of about $20.00. The combined cost
of Fortnightly's two systems was between $750,000 and $1,000,000. See United Artists
Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 at 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) and 392
U.S. 390, 393, n.7 (1968).
22. For a complete and detailed analysis of the process, see United Artists Television,
Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 at 187-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See infra notes
30-37 and accompanying text.
23. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
24. Exclusive rights as to copyrighted work. Any person entitled thereto, upon com-
plying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right.
(c) To deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or present the copyrighted work in
public for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, address or similar production, or
their non-dramatic literary work; to make or procure the making of any
transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may
in any manner or by any method be exhibited, delivered, presented, produced,
or reproduced; and to play or perform it in public for profit, and to exhibit,
represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method what-
soever. . ..
(d) To performt or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama, or,
if it be a dramatic work and not reproduced in copies for sale, to vend any
manuscript or any record whatsoever thereof; to make or to procure the
making of any transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or
in part, it may in any manner or by any method be excluded, Performed,
represented, produced or reproduced, and to exhibit, perform, represent, pro-
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to the copyright holder the exclusive right to "perform ... in public for profit
[non-dramatic literary works]," and to "perform . . . publicly [dramatic
works] .125 United Artists sought damages and injunctive relief. The issue of
infringement was separately tried,26 and the court ruled in favor of United
Artists. On interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. section 1292 (b)27 the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,2 8 and certiorari was granted.2
9
Reversing, the Supreme Court held that Fortnightly did not, through its CATV
systems, "perform" the copyrighted motion pictures within the meaning of the
Copyright Act, and thus was not liable for copyright infringement.
C. The Fortnightly Decision.
1. Fortnightly at the District Court
The instant case was tried in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in 1966. Fortnightly defended on several
grounds: (1) it did not perform the copyrighted motion pictures in public
because the motion pictures were not made visible or audible within the CATV
system, but were rendered visible and audible only by the operation of privately
owned television sets of the subscribers; (2) a license for its operations should
be implied in law by virtue of the fact that the original broadcast was licensed;
and (3) the imposition of copyright liability upon its activities would erode
the underlying purpose of the Federal Communications Act "to secure the
maximum benefits of radio [and television] to all the people of the United
States."30
duce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever....
17 U.S.C. §§ 1(c) and (d) (1964) (emphasis added).
25. Id. "Drama" has been interpreted so as to include much of the material of which
television programs are comprised including motion picture photoplays. Patterson v. Century
Productions, Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Hervert v. Shanley Co., 229 F. 340 (2d Cir.
1916); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 3 F. Supp. 66 (D.
Mass. 1933); Tiffany Productions, Inc. v. Dewing, 50 F.2d 911 (D. Md. 1931).
26. Pursuant to Pre-Trial Order Number Two, February 7, 1966, the district court
ordered that the trial of the action proceed in four designated stages; that the basic issues
of copyright infringement and licenses implied in law be tried first, and that other defenses
such as unfair trade practices and unfair competition be tried in subsequent stages.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1967): "When a district judge, in making in a civil action
an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The
Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from
such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order:
Provided, however, that application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in
the district court unless the district judge or Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall
so order."
28. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967).
29. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 389 U.S. 969 (1967).
30. See United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872, 883 (2d
Cir. 1967). Fortnightly's contention is that "commercial television broadcasting . . .is gov-
erned by the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1967), as
implemented by regulation promulgated by the F.C.C., and under the Act so implemented
no person may lawfully impose a charge upon the reception of commercial television broad-
73
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It appears from the defenses that the courts were going to be forced to
test the validity of their decisions in the radio cases in the context of the cable
television industry. In his opinion for the district court, Judge Herlands an-
swered the first defense only after closely examining and comparing the various
electronic and technological functions of the equipment used in CATV systems
with those used in the television broadcasting industry.
The court's findings revealed that the performance of the copyrighted
motion pictures by the licensed television stations consists of transducing3 '
motion picture films into electro-magnetic energy, a process whereby nothing
audible nor visible was produced in its studios.3 2 These findings further concluded
that Fortnightly's operations begin after the television broadcaster has radiated
the electro-magnetic energy toward the horizon by use of its broadcasting
antenna. Programs, the films in this case, in the form of the electro-magnetic
waves are received on Fortnightly's antennas, and then travel through coaxial
cables to a building where the "head equipment" is located. The function of this
"head equipment" is to modulate, on new carrier waves derived from locally
supplied electrical energy, the pattern of variations of the input signals. Thereby,
there are created output signals which are replicas in electronic terms of the
input signals. The essential feature of Fortnightly's systems is that they
duplicate and reproduce, on newly supplied energy, patterns, arrangements, con-
figuration variations, and sequences of energy that originated from the original
broadcast antenna . 3 The net effect of Fortnightly's electronic processing is to
transmit through its coaxial cables to its subscribers reproduced signals on new
carrier waves. Based upon these findings of fact regarding the technical aspect
of the various equipment used by the television broadcaster and by Fortnightly,
the court found no merit in Fortnightly's contention that nothing audible or
visible was produced in its studios.
3 4
Both forms of energy function as technological equivalents in the sense
that each represents a "manner" in and "method" by which one may
"perform," within the meaning of section 1 (c) and (d) of the Copy-
right Act.35
casts and every person is free to receive such broadcasts by the equipment of his choice."
Fortnightly argues that if~it is required to pay a royalty to copyright holders, such amount
would have to be passed along to its subscribers and consequently they would be charged
for reception of commercial television, a result which is proscribed by the above mentioned
legislative scheme. Also, by absorbing the royalties, the subscribers would be paying twice
for the opportunity of seeing the protected material, the first payment being indirectly
made when subscribers buy the products advertised on the commercial broadcasting stations.
This defense was dealt with quite quickly in both lower court decisions and therefore will
not be discussed further in this paper.
31. Transduction-process by which sight/sound has been converted into its electronic
counterpart or replica, the video/audio signal-a form of electrical energy. Sec United
Artists Television Corp. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177, at 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
32. Id. at 196.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 191-93.
35. Id. at 205.
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The court thus found Fortnightly liable for copyright infringement. In language
strikingly similar to the holdings in Buck and SESAC, the district court held:
[W]hen a CATV system, for profit plays so substantial a part in a
reproduction of a broadcast being seen and heard by the public that
the only act necessary to transduce the electromagnetic waves it has
processed and transmitted to subscribers into an audible and visible
production of the broadcast performance is a minor, albeit essential
one-such as "turning the knob" on a homeowner's television set
the CATV system must be said to have infringed upon the exclusive
right to "perform" ... [within the meaning of the Copyright Act].36
Thus, here, as in SESAC, the court decides as immaterial the issue of who per-
formed the "last act."
In rejecting Fortnightly's contention that there was an implied in law
license, the court said the question is not one of the existence of such a license,
but rather whether public policy warrants the creation of one. The court decided
it does not.37
2. Fortnigktly at the Circuit Court of Appeals
The circuit court of appeals, in affirming the district court decision, chose
not to rely as heavily upon the analysis of the highly technical functions carried
out by Fortnightly."5 The court instead relied more expressly upon the approach
of the radio cases. As was the case in Buck and SESAC, the court here was
primarily concerned with the extent of Fortnightly's activities: "How much did
the petitioner [Fortnightly] do to bring about the viewing and hearing of a
copyrighted work?"3 9 The court found that Fortnightly had done more to bring
about viewing of the motion pictures than the hotels in the radio cases had done
to provide radio programing for their guests. The court, therefore, on the
strength of the radio cases, held that Fortnightly's CATV systems publicly
performed the motion pictures which they carried on their systems because
such carriage resulted in the simultaneous viewing of the programs by. its
subscribers.40
In its treatment of the issue of an implied in law license, the court explicitly
recognized the confusion that had arisen as to which type of implied license was
intended by Justice Brandeis' footnote.41 Apparently, the issue was formulated
36. Id. at 214.
37. Id. at 211: "The question being not whether there is an implied in law license
to perform publicly for profit but whether there should be, this court holds that there
should not." The court speaks specifically of a license implied in law.
38. The court found ". . . that the result produced by defendant's systems constitutes
a public performance, and that the technical means by which the result is produced are
irrelevant to this issue." See United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d
872, n.9 at 879-80 (2d Cir. 1967).
39. Id. at 877.
40. Id. at 879.
41. See text accompanying note 18 supra. It is difficult to ascertain why Mr. Justice
Brandeis raised the issue at all, for in the body of his opinion he seemed to deal with the
question quite conclusively: "And since the public reception for profit itself constitutes an
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in these terms: can a license implied in law make unenforceable the prohibiting
terms of a licensing agreement? The court decided that the agreement of the
parties must control in this case:
In an age of motion pictures and radio and television broadcasting...
a copyright proprietor must be allowed substantial freedom to limit
licenses to perform his work in public to defined periods and areas or
audiences. 42
The answer reached by the court serves to illustrate how a decision regarding a
license implied in law turns ultimately upon a determination of what result the
court deems that public policy warrants.
3. Fortnightly at the Supreme Court
The circuit court, through its decision, easily accommodated CATV to the
doctrine of the radio cases. The Supreme Court, however, was not so inclined.
By an 8-1 majority, the Court reversed the decision of the circuit court of
appeals and held that Fortnightly did not "perform" the movies in question,
and was therefore not liable for copyright infringement.43
a. The Precedent of Buck
In its attempt to insulate the CATV industry from the authority of the
radio cases, the Court challenges the vitality of Buck by characterizing it as "a
questionable 35-year old decision that in actual practice has not been applied
outside its own factual context. '4
The Court expressly rejects Buck's quantitative test, which was used by
the court of appeals, on the ground that it is not "the proper test to determine
copyright liability in the context of television broadcasting." 45 Its reasons
for not extending Buck are not stated explicitly in the body of the opinion;
however an attempt to justify its finding is presented in the footnotes. The most
revealing is the one which simply implies that the decision in Buck was not
correct when it was decided, and therefore, it would be unwise for the Court
to extend what it feels to be a "questionable" decision into a new factual context
merely on the weight of precedent. 46
After saying that Buck was not applicable, the Court added a superfluous
line of support when it distinguished Buck on its facts. In stating the Buck
should be limited to its own circumstances the Court raised the footnote state-
ment of Justice Brandeis which suggested that a different result possibly would
infringement, we have no occasion to determine under what circumstances a broadcaster
will be held to be a performer or the effect upon others of his paying a license fee." See
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, at 198 (1931).
42. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872 at 882 (2d Cir.
1967).
43. Fortnightly Corporation v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
44. Id. at 401 n.30.
45. Id. at 397.
46. Id. at 401.
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have been reached if the original broadcast had been licensed. Noting that the
original broadcasts transmitted by Fortnightly were licensed, the Court held
Buck not to be binding precedent. 47
b. The Functional Test
Once the Court had removed the instant case from the authority of Buck
it offered a new test for determining the question of performance. The Court
characterizes its new test as one which depends upon "a determination of the
function that a CATV systems play in the total process of television broad-
casting and reception." 48 This "functional" test seemingly represents a point of
departure from the Buck or "quantitative" test. In the Buck test, the primary
concern was the extent of the rebroadcaster's activities, whereas the "func-
tional" test seems to require an analysis of the nature of the rebroadcaster's
acts.
c. Functional Analysis-The Court's Test Applied
The initial step taken by the Court in its analysis was to divide the television
broadcasting process into two separate segments: one side including the broad-
casters, who perform; 49 the other side including the viewers, who do not per-
form. 0 The court had to decide into which segment Fortnightly fell. In arriving
at its decision the Court appraised the function served by CATV in the overall
television broadcasting process. It found that although the equipment that a
CATV system uses is highly powerful and complex, its basic function is little
different from that of the normal equipment furnished by the television viewer
(i.e., rooftop antennas, boosters, etc.).51 In support of this position, the Court
offered that in the case of several neighbors combining to set up their own
antenna system there would be no liability for performing copyrighted material.
The only distinction between that situation and CATV is that in the latter an
entrepreneur would assume the undertaking. An additional consideration is the
great difference in the functions served by CATV as opposed to broadcasters.
In its finding that CATV systems have, functionally, little in common with
broadcasters, the Court dealt with the procurement of marterial to be broad-
cast, the assembly of programs, and the editing of programing. The Court
47. Id. at 398 n.23. 5ad this been the only basis for not following Buck, the court's
disregard of the express prohibition against sub-licensing would have raised anew the issue
of implied in law and implied in fact licenses and perhaps called for some discussion of
SESAC. But the whole discussion is better viewed as an attempt to get away from Buck
without expressly overruling it.
Mr. Justice Fortas' dissenting opinion urged the court to follow the precedent of Buck
and SESAC so as to do as little damage to existing copyright-broadcaster relationships
until Congress enacts curative legislation. The dissent would be satisfied with abandoning
Buck and SESAC if the majority would have substituted an interpretation of "perform"
that was as clear and workable as the Buck interpretation. Id. at 404.
48. Id. at 397.
49. Id. at 398 n.23.
.5O. Id. at 398 n.24.
51. Id. at 399.
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found these areas to be completely within the domain of the broadcasters,
and outside the function of most CATV systems.5 2
In a footnote, the Court offers another difference between CATV systems
and broadcasters: the latter sell their broadcasting time and facilities to
sponsors, not to the public, whereas CATV systems sell antenna service to
certain segments of the public.53 The Court concluded its findings by stating:
CATV systems do not in fact broadcast or rebroadcast. Broad-
casters select the programs to be viewed. CATV systems simply carry,
without editing, whatever programs they receive. Broadcasters procure
programs and propagate them to the public; CATV systems receive pro-
grams that have been released to the public and carry them by private
channels to additional viewers. We hold that CATV operators, like
viewers and unlike broadcasters, do not perform the program that they
receive and carry.54
d. The Court's Refusal to Expressly Balance Competing Interests
The Court was urged in an amicus curiae brief, submitted by the Solicitor
General, to render a decision that would accommodate various competing con-
siderations of copyright, communications, and antitrust policy. The Court
declined because it felt that it must work within the Copyright Act of 1909,
and that adjustment of these competing interests cited by the Solicitor General
was a job incumbent upon the Congress.55
IV. Tm SuppimE CouRT OPINIoN-ANALYSIS
Two questions about the Fortnightly decision itself should be considered:
(1) did the majority properly consider Buck; and (2) assuming that Buck
was properly considered, is the functional test substituted by the majority of any
analytical value beyond its use in the instant case?
A. The Radio Cases
1. Buck
As was discussed previously, the Court, in part, held Buck to be inapplicable
to Fortnightly on the ground of a factual distinction: the original broadcast in
Fortnightly was licensed, while that was not the case in Buck." The Court's
attempt to limit the authority of Buck by distinguishing it from Fortnightly
52. See text accompanying infra note 92 for discussion of how proposed rules by the
F.C.C. would require CATV systems to originate programing.
53. Fortnightly Corporation v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 at 400
n.28 (1968).
54. Id. at 400-01. The Court summarily disposed of the question of an implied in law
license by stating in a footnote:
[Slince we hold that the petitioner's systems did not perform copyrighted works,
we do not reach the question of implied license.
Id. at n.32.
55. See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of proposed legis-
lation in the CATV-copyright area.
56. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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on the basis of an originally licensed performance appears to be wide of
the mark, for the determination of the question of performance, which is what
the Buck test resolves, does not turn upon the existence of a license; rather,
the existence of a license is raised as a defense to copyright liability, only after
performance has been established.5 7 This dichotomy is pointed out by the Court
itself. "Since we hold that the petitioner's system did not perform copyrighted
works, we do not reach the question of implied license."58 Thus the distinction
between Buck and the Fortnightly case regarding the licensing of the original
broadcast does not in itself justify the abrogation of the quantitative test
developed in Buck.59
2. The Functional Test
a. Implied in Law License
In essence, the result reached by the Court, through the application of its
"functional test" very closely matches the result that was urged upon the Court
by Fortnightly on the theory of an implied in law license. Fortnightly argued
that when a copyright holder licensed the original broadcast, he also licensed
the private segment of the audience to receive the broadcast. Flowing from this
license to the private set owners, Fortnightly contended that an additional license
should be implied allowing CATV systems to aid the public in receiving pro-
graming which they have the right to receive. Clearly, the Court has moved
57. This argument is concisely stated by Mr. justice Fortas in a footnote to his
dissenting opinion. See Fortnightly Corporation v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S.
at 406 n.5 (1968).
58. Id. at 400.
59. The other reason offered by the court for not extending the radio cases is that
Buck is at best a questionable 35-year old decision which should therefore not be extended
beyond its factual context. This seems to be the basic and primary reason for the court's
derogation from Buck's authority. Although the court was not very expansive in enumerat-
ing factual distinctions that may exist between Buck and the Fortnightly situation, one
can readily see two factual distinctions which could prove a plausible basis for distinguish-
ing Fortnightly from Buck: (1) when the "multiple performances" occurred in the radio
cases, they all occurred within the defendant's physical plant, which is considered a public
facility (see Society of European State Authors and Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel
Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1937)), whereas the alleged "multiple performances"
which occurred in Fortnightly occurred in the private homes of the subscribers, and, (2) the
equipment through which the performance was made audible in the radio cases was owned
by the defendants, whereas in Fortnightly, the television receiving sets were owned by the
subscribers. Although these contentions were unsuccessfully raised by the defendant in the
lower courts they could be the factual differences which the court might have considered
as sufficient grounds for removing the instant case from the authority of the radio cases.
If these considerations did motivate the court's reasoning, it is tantamount to saying that
although there may be "multiple performandes" by CATV systems, they are not in fact,
public performances, for they occur within the private residence of the set owner and on his
private set. However, the court in the Jerome H. Remick & Sons v. American Auto Acces-
sories Co., Inc. case anticipated this problem:
Nor can a performance, in our judgment, be deemed private because each listener
may enjoy it alone in the privacy of his home .... The [performer] is consciously
addressing a great, though unseen and widely scattered audience, and is therefore
participating in a public performance.
See Jerome H. Remick & Sons v. American Auto Accessories, 5 F.2d 411 at 412 (6th CiL
1925).
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in this direction when it characterizes a CATV system as serving basically the
same functions as equipment used by set owners, despite the fact that the
CATV system's equipment is far more powerful and sophisticated.
To support this, the Court points out that individual viewers who might
combine to establish their own CATV system would incur no copyright liability,
and, therefore, by analogy, there is no logical basis for holding liable an
entrepreneur who undertakes the same enterprise. Further the Court points out
that the programs received by CATV systems have been released to the public
and are carried by private channels to additional viewers. 60 By conceptualizing
a CATV system as an adjunct to the viewers' home receiving set and concluding
from that basic premise that no performance has occurred, what the Court has
done is to give effect to the result sought to be achieved by the imposition of an
implied in law license, but, the manner chosen by the Court to achieve the result
was a process of explicit legal reasoning leading to a legal conclusion, rather
than merely stating a legal conclusion under the expression of a license implied
in law.
b. The Functional Test and Its Effect on The Radio Industry.
One of the dissenting opinion's objections in that it is wrong to replace the
"quantatitive" test, which although not completely satisfactory, has been the
settled test for the last 40 years, with the "functional" test, which it feels will
not provide sufficient guidance for future construction of the Copyright Act. 1'
A reading of the instant case should assuage any fear entertained by the
radio industry that the Fortnightly holding will erode the foundations upon
which they have established their business arrangements. The Court clearly
indicates, first, that the decision in Fortnightly is made with reference to its
particular facts, 62 and, second, that the radio cases are limited to their own facts
and implicitly affirms them to the extent they have been adopted by the radio
industry. 3 Thus it seems eminently clear that the Court has not attempted
to emasculate the authority of the radio cases where they have established the
basis for present relationships in the radio industry.
Another point may be offered to alleviate the fear that the Fortnightly
decision will upset long standing relationships in the industry. Even if we were
to assume that the Fortnightly decision would overrule Buck, it seems a
reasonable assumption that Buck would have been decided the same under the
"functional" test as it was under the "quantitative" test, i.e., an infringement
would have been established.0 4
60. ". . . CATV systems receive programs that have been released to the public and
carry them by private channel to additional viewers." Fortnightly Corporation v. United
Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 at 400 (1968).
61. Id. at 405.
62. Id. at 399 n.25.
63. Id. at 401 n.30.
64. Based on the manner in which the "functional test" was applied to the facts in
Fortnightly, the first question to ask in its application to Buck is: Was the hotel an active
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c. Possible Ambiguity of the Test.
Another problem with the functional test is raised by the possible ambiguity
that may result in future attempts at applying it. The problem, foreseen by Mr.
Justice Fortas,65 can be illustrated within the history of the Fortnigktly litiga-
tion. The holding in the district court was characterized as being strongly
phrased in terms of the radio cases; yet, that decision was ultimately premised
upon a detailed study of the "functional" aspects of Fortnightly's equipment.
More precisely, the court did examine the nature of Fortnightly's operations.
The different conclusions reached in the district court and in the Supreme Court
raise the problem of two courts analyzing the same situation in terms of "func-
tion" and arriving at drastically different results. This type of inconsistency
is perhaps what Mr. Justice Fortas fears will result from future applications
of the "functional" test.
In the district court decision, Judge Herlands, on the basis of an exhaustive
comparison of the technical functions served by television broadcasting systems
and CATV systems, concluded that the two processes were so similar that the
CATV systems did "perform" within the meaning of the Copyright Act, and thus
were liable for infringement.
The dominant, overall function and design of defendant's [Fort-
nightly's] system at all times-regardless of the individual instruments
or specific equipment used from time to time-were and are aimed
at the objective of propagating electromagnetic energy for the purpose
of transmitting T. V. program material to a large number of sub-
scribers, who are, in effect, their audience. In view of the foregoing
characteristics, defendant's [Fortnightly's] systems are, in material
respects, analogous to television stations, translator, and repeater
stations.
66
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, refused to give weight to the analysis
of a function that is "virtually instantaneous,16 7 that is, the basic electronic
functions carried out by both systems' equipment. Instead, the Court analyzed
the functions of CATV systems first in comparison with the functions served
by the homeowners' equipment, and then with the functions of television
broadcaster, who performed, or merely a passive receiver who did not perform. It would
appear that the hotels were akin to broadcasters in that the function served by the re-
broadcasts to the guest rooms was one which allowed the hotels to utilize these radio
broadcasts as an alternative to performing copyrighted music through the hiring of live
orchestras. Therefore, the function served by the rebroadcasts in Buck was not one of
merely facilitating the reception of radio programing for the individuals for whom the
original broadcasts were intended, but rather, it was an attempt by the hotels to use the
original broadcasts for their own commercial purposes, as an alternative to hiring live enter-
tainment, which would produce royalty revenue for the copyright holder.
65. Fortnightly Corporation v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 at 405
(1968).
66. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 at 196
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text regarding technical
finding of the district court.
67. Fortnightly Corporation v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 at 401
n.27 (1968).
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broadcasters. The Court concluded that functionally, CATV systems' equipment
served the same purpose as the equipment used by home owners and secondly,
that the operations of CATV systems differed radically from those operations
of television broadcasters. The operations compared in the second analysis dealt
with revenue raising and program make-up. Thus it can be seen that while the
district court defined and applied "function" with respect to the method of
performing copyrighted material, the Supreme Court applied "function" in terms
of the results of the activities of the parties involved. It would appear that the
district court more precisely addressed itself to the basic issue involved: Do
CATV systems "perform" the motion pictures which they carry to their sub-
scribers? Its analysis delved into the very manner in which the copyrighted
motion pictures are performed, whereas the Supreme Court relied on differences
that exist in the very general operations of the two industries, and these con-
siderations appear to be peripheral to the narrow issue that was before the court
for consideration.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO JUDICIAL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Court Will Not Resolve The Problem
For almost as long as the present Copyright Act has been in effect, the
Court has been faced with the problem of applying it to an ever-changing
technology. This theme is well illustrated both in the radio cases and in the
CATV situation. Concomitant with this problem of applying the Act to a
mushrooming technology is the unavoidable presence of competing economic
interests. It has been suggested that the decisions in the radio cases attempted
to balance the conflicting interests involved therein while still working within
the Copyright Act. The Court entertains a different attitude, however, in the
Fortnightly case. The Court recognizes the conflicts that exist, but it refuses to
adjust them by the method urged upon it by the Solicitor General in his amicus
curiae brief. In doing so the Court made it clear that it must reach its decision
on the basis of the Copyright Act of 1909 "as we find it," and if there is to be
a change in this statutory framwork, it is a job incumbent upon the Congress,
not the Court. 8 By its own admission of basing its decision upon the Copyright
Act "as [they] find it," the Court raises an inconsistency in its logic. The
Copyright Act which the Court applied to the facts in this case is certainly not
the very same one which Congress passed in 1909, for it has not existed in a
vacuum these many years, completely insulated from the effects of time and
change. Indeed, as this comment has pointed out, from the time the Act was
passed it has been undergoing constant judicial review which has the unalterable
consequence of adding to the statute a "judicial gloss" which serves to define
and refine the meaning of the statute. Thus, the Copyright Act which the Court
had before it in 1968 included the "gloss" resulting from the Court's decisions
68. Id. at 401.
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in the radio cases. Therefore, a decision based strictly upon the Copyright Act
as found at the time of the Fortnightly decisions seems to point to a result
diametrically opposed to that reached by the Court.
B. Congressional Activity
The intention of the Court to strictly apply the Copyright Act of 1909,
taken in conjunction with its statement that Congress is the appropriate forum
for establishing a new framework within which to settle copyright disputes,
clearly forces the attention of those who are interested in affecting a change in
this area to be focused on Congress rather than the courts. Congress, in fact,
has begun to address itself to the problems of copyright in the CATV industry
in two ways: (1) by proposed revision of the Copyright Act; and (2) by
giving the FCC authority over the CATV industry through that body's rule-
making power.
1. Copyright Revision
A revision of the Copyright Act of 1909 was begun in 1955, but progress
was slow until the 90th Congress, when revision bills were introduced in
both the House and Senate.0 9 As originally reported, the House bill contained
a section dealing specifically with CATV systems.70 This section divided CATV
activities into three broad geographic areas which have been designated: black,
white, and gray.71 "Black" areas are those areas considered to be adequately
served by existing television stations.7 2 Under the proposed section, any trans-
mission of a distant station into this "black" area by a CATV system would
result in full copyright liability for the offending system.7 3 The "white" area
is described as that area that normally receives the stations carried by a CATV
system. 74 Thus, the carriage of such stations by a CATV system in a "white"
area would not result in copyright liability on the part of the CATV system.
The "gray" area is an area that does not have adequate television service.75
In these "gray" areas, CATV is to be given the benefit of a compulsory license
to bring in distant stations in consideration of royalty payments agreed to
by the interested parties.7 6 In the event of a stalemate, the court is to determine
a reasonable royalty.?7
This section was originally added to repeal the district court decision
which held CATV fully liable for copyright infringement.7 8 However, when
69. See H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., and S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
70. See H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (1967).
71. See H.R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-59 (1967).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See 113 Cong. Rec. H. 3614-3625 (April 6, 1967).
83
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the bill was before the House, it was decided that the matter more correctly
belonged to the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, which has jurisdic-
tion over communication, and thus section 111 of the proposed bill was deleted,
and subsequently, the bill as amended was passed by the House, and sent to
the Senate.79 The proposed section clearly represented an attempt to reconcile
the competing interests of the copyright holders, the public, and the CATV
systems. The major criticism of this proposed section is the relegation of the
duty to the courts of establishing a "reasonable" royalty where such royalties
are required in the "gray" area. A decision in this area requires the ability to
analyze the economic effect of broadcasts on local markets, the determination of
geographical areas based upon highly technical criteria, and other problems
requiring an expertise in the technical-economic matrix of television broadcast-
ing. A more realistic alternative would be to have the question of a "reasonable"
royalty determined by an independent board possessing the requisite expertise
in the field.
2. Regulation by the Federal Communications Commission
a. Present Rules
The other area where there is active extra-judicial activity is in the Federal
Communications Commission. Originally, the Commission refused jurisdiction
over the industry claiming that it did not have the requisite authority under
the Communications Act of 1934.80 As the CATV industry grew, and its impact
was more widely felt, the FCC reversed its attitude, and in 1966, in a rule-
making proceeding, it adopted rules governing CATV systems.8' Under the
"carriage" rule CATV systems are required to transmit to their subscribers the
signals of any station into whose service area they have brought competing
signals.8 2 The second rule forbids CATV systems from duplicating the program-
ing of such local stations for periods of 15 days before and after a local broad-
.cast.8 3 This is known as the "duplication" rule. The Commission also forbade
CATV systems from importing distant signals into the 100 largest television
markets; however, certain exceptions are provided for.84 Finally, the Commis-
sion provided for summary non-hearing procedures for the disposition of applica-
tions for relief.8 5 The Commission's position in this area has been enhanced
by two recent cases. In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 6 the Supreme
Court held that under the Communications Act, the FCC has authority to
79. The Senate did not act upon the bill during the 90th Congress. However, on
January 22, 1969, Senator John L. McClellan introduced the revision bill in its original
form (i.e., including § 111) to the new Senate. See S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
80. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1967), and 26 F.C.C. 403 at 427-28 (1959).
81. Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C. 2d 725
82. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1103(a) (1969).
83. Id.
84. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1103(b) (1969).
85. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1109 (1969).
86. 390 U.S. 157 (1968).
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regulate CATV systems. In Conley Electronics Corp. v. F.C.C., the Supreme
Court, by refusing to grant certiorari, 87 upheld a circuit court decision88 which
held the rule against non-duplication valid.
b. New Riles Proposed
On December 13, 1968, the FCC published proposed new CATV rules.89
The Commission explains the need for new rule-making and inquiry on the basis
of technological improvements in the CATV industry which will soon allow the
process to expand to a twenty channel capacity.9 0 The result of this expansion
is the creation of new channels of communications for public and commercial
use, which heretofore were not available due either to prohibitive cost or tech-
nical inadequacy. The objective sought by the Commission in this rule-making
procedure is to insure that the expected benefits of the newly expanded capacity
of CATV systems will inure to the public by assuring them the most efficient
and effective communications service possible.
In order to achieve this objective, the Commission has proposed rules and
invited comments thereon in several different areas: program origination, diversi-
fication of ownership, importation of television signals, reporting requirements,
and technical standards.91
Program Origination. The proposal requiring program origination is new
to the Commission's scheme of regulation over CATV. The timeliness for this
rule follows directly from the expected increased expansion of channel capacity.92
The Commission feels that the possibility of having 20 channels available for use
will give CATV systems the technical flexibility to provide local outlets for
community self expression and for augmenting the public's choice of programs
and types of services. The presentation of these special interest programs on
originating channels would have the added advantage of not forcing regular
network presentations to go off the air in order to provide air time for these
programs.
The Commission contemplates conditioning the CATV's use of broadcast
signals upon a requirement that it originate programs, except in the case of the
very smallest CATV systems. Unresolved is the cutoff point for determining
who shall be required to originate and who shall not. Tentatively, the criteria
87. 393 U.S. 858 (1968).
88. Conley Electronics Corp. v. F.C.C., 394 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1968).
89. 33 Fed. Reg. 19028.
90. Id.
91. With respect to reporting requirements and technical standards, the Commission
is not submitting formal rules. It feels that these areas are not ripe for present action, but
it would entertain any suggestions for possible future rule making. The Commission would
be interested in reports that would keep it abreast of the developments in the CATV in-
dustry. Information requested would probably include location of CATV systems, program
origination, channel capacity, broadcast signals aired, as well as financial data and owner-
ship interests.
The Commission also suggests the possible future need to establish minimum technical
standards for equipment and signal output. Id. at 19032.
92. Id. at 19029.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
will be established in light of the marginal cost of the equipment and personnel
required for local origination.
Diversification of Ownership. The second area of rule-making is one which
has caused a great deal of public concern. It is feared by many that unless there
is some type of governmental intervention, that eventually the ownership of
CATV systems would rest in the bands of a very few powerful corporations who
may also own other communications media. The Commission has proposed rules
to prevent such an occurrence. First, it would prohibit cross-ownership of CATV
systems and television stations in the same area, thus minimizing the possibility
of horizontal communications monopoly in any one area. 3 Second, the Com-
mission proposes to limit on a nationwide basis the total number of systems to
be commonly owned.9 4 The basis for limitation would turn upon consideration of
the number of subscribers, the size of the communities, and the regional con-
centration and other broadcast interests of the CATV operatorY5
The third proposal in this area stems from the Commission's concern over
the potential control a CATV system would have over program selection when
the system reaches its twenty channel capacity. To mitigate against abuse of this
power, the Commission proposes to limit CATV systems to one channel for
program origination. 9 6 This limitation would not apply to channels used for
presentation of weather reports, stock reports, etc. An additional proposal
would encourage CATV systems to operate as common carriers on the unused
channels. This, it is hoped, would result in programing that is not entirely
regulated by the CATV owners.
Importation of Distant Signals. Most germane to this discussion are the
proposed rules relating to importation of distant television signals by a CATV
system. Under present regulations, no CATV system may carry a distant signal
within the Grade A contour of any station in the 100 largest television mar-
kets 7 The only time an exception is allowed is upon a showing in an eviden-
tiary hearing that such carriage of distant signals is consistent with the public
interest and, particularly, that it is consistent with the establishment and
healthy maintenance of television broadcast service in the area.08 At the time
this rule was adopted, the Commission believed that the use of distant signals
by CATV systems raised substantial questions of economic impact and unfair
competition with respect to newly established UHF stations. The Commission
characterized the situation whereby UHF stations had to pay for television
programing while CATV system did not, as one of unfair competition. To gain
more insight into this problem, the Commission established the evidentiary
hearings. After two and one-half years of hearings, the Commission has decided,
93. Id. at 19031.
94. Id. at 19032.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1107 (1969).
98. Id.
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on the strength of the Midwest Television, Inc. hearings,9 9 that CATV pene-
tration in a major market will be significant, and that the impact on UHF
broadcast stations of the unfair competition will correspondingly be significant
and undesirable. Thus the Commission proposes to eliminate the evidentiary
hearings and in its place set up a rule whereby importation of distant signals
into the top 100 markets would be allowed, but only on the condition that
the CATV system which desires to import the distant signals has obtained re-
transmission consent of the originating stations. 100 The Commission would limit
their consent requirement only to importation of distant signals into the top
100 markets. It recognizes the need for such importation into the smaller
markets which are characteristically underserved. The Commission would, how-
ever, establish a reasonable compulsory licensing fee system for the carriage of
distant signals into these small or underserved areas.' 1
The Commission points out that it expects the new Congress to act upon
the Copyright Revision Bill with a new appraisal of the CATV section which
had been deleted by the House in the 90th Congress,'10 2 and had not been
acted on by the Senate. The Commission will continue hearings on this pro-
posed area of rule-making but will not act until Congress has more clearly
shown its intention in the area.
The Commission, however, may not have to wait very long, for shortly
after the Commission released its proposed rules, Senator McClellan intro-
duced the Copyright Revision Bill to the Senate as it was originally drawn
(S. 597), thus including the specific section on CATV. 0 3 Whether or not the
Senate will delete the section as the House did is of course unknown; how-
ever, certain comments made by Senator McClellan when he introduced the
bill lead one suspect that it is his feeling that the section should be deleted:
The text of certain sections of the bill, notaby those relating to
the copyright liability of operators of . . . cable television systems,
has been, for all practical purposes, rendered moot by events sub-
sequent to the original introduction of S. 597.104
It is not clear whether the Senator is referring to the decision in Fortnightly,
or, since his remarks were made on January 22, 1969, that he feels the rules
proposed by the FCC for CATV are the proper solution. In any event, it
appears that the problem will not be resolved through revision of the Copy-
right Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fortnightly clearly indicates that many of the problems and conflicts in-
herent in the rapidly developing field of communication technology cannot be
99. 13 F.C.C. 2d 478 (1968).
100. 33 Fed. Reg. 19028 at 19035.
101. Id. at 19035.
102. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
103. See S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
104. 115 Cong. Rec. S. 664 (daily ed., Jan. 22, 1969).
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resolved by using a 60 year old statute whose operative terms have been
defined largely in the anachronistic context of the radio industry. Nor, ap-
parently, can there be any viable redefinition of such terms as "performance"
so as to meaningfully update the Copyright Law. 05
The questionable utility of the Court's new "functional test" is graphically
apparent when viewed in light of the proposed F.C.C. rules.100 The Court in
Fortnightly found that originating and editing programing were not functions
carried out by CATV systems, and this finding aided the Court in determining
that there was no performance. One of the proposed F.C.C. rules, however,
would require that CATV stations originate programs as a condition for
federal licensing.'0 7 If a CATV system does comply with this licensing condi-
tion, would it not therefore follow that the carriage of copyrighted motion
pictures by a CATV system would result in "performance" under the court's
test?
At this point, two alternatives are available for resolving the question of
the CATV system's status in the communications industry. The first is inclu-
sion of a specific provision regarding CATV in the Revised Copyright Law. 08
While the substance of the section proposed in the present Copyright Revision
Bill is basically desirable, the very fact that it is embodied in a copyright
statute is undesirable for two reasons. First, any new statute, while adequate
for present situations, will still be subject to application to future, unforeseen
developments through judicial interpretation. The growing complexity of the
communications industry demands technical expertise in the problem solving
process and accordingly relegates the role of judicial interpretation to one of
little utility.
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, the copyright problem represents
only one of the troublesome areas of an entire complex of interrelated problems.
Approaching this one problem by use of the Copyright Law withdraws the
issues from the very context in which they are defined and in which may lay
their solution.
Regulation by the F.C.C., therefore, appears to be the most promising
avenue to take in establishing harmony in the area. The most appealing virtue
of F.C.C. regulation is its ability to act quickly and responsively to new de-
velopments in the industry as a whole. Rules and regulations would be devel-
oped by people who have the expertise required for analyzing problems and
their implications. This point is demonstrated in the proposed F.C.C. rules
for CATV systems. The Commission does not deal just with copyright prob-
lems, but it has established a scheme of regulation that is designed to encom-
pass the many diverse problem elements in the industry with the ultimate aim
log. See text accompanying supra notes 65-67.
106. See text accompanying supra notes 89-104.
107. See text accompanying supra note 92.
108. See text accompanying supra notes 69-79.
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of achieving the most equitable relationships for all involved. This approach
is far better than a piecemeal attempt at resolving the various problems as
though they existed independently of each other.
ALAN R. CHASE

